This paper models the gold standard as a state contingent commitment rule that is only feasible during peace. It shows that monetary policy during war, when the gold convertibility rule is suspended, can still be credible, if the policy maker's plan is to resume the gold standard at the old par value in the future. The DGE model developed in this paper suggests that the resumption of the gold standard was a sustainable plan, which replaced the gold standard as a commitment rule and made monetary policy time consistent. The equilibrium is supported by trigger strategies, where private agents retaliate if a policy maker defaults its policy plan to resume the gold standard rule.
Introduction
Traditionally the gold standard has been modelled as an automatic and impersonal monetary system, 'golden fetters', which restricted sovereigns'power over economic policy. The gold standard rule obligated each central bank to maintain the value of the national paper currency in terms of a …xed weight of gold by buying and selling gold at a …xed price on demand. 1 The convertibility rule and reserves set a limit to the money supply and guaranteed almost zero in ‡ation.
2 Yet, if we expand our focus from the relatively short-lived International
Classical Gold Standard of 1880-1914 to a wider time horizon, the gold standard and other commodity standards do not emerge as such disciplinarian rules. According to the surveys by Kydland (1995, 1996) and Bordo and Schwartz (1997) Instead of a monotonic policy rule, this paper considers the gold standard as a commitment mechanism that restricted monetary policy during normal times, but which became unfeasible during major wars and crises. Because monetary authorities were able to decide how much inconvertible …duciary money to issue during the suspension periods, they were predecessors of the modern …at money system. But compared with the hyperin ‡ationary paper money experiments of the twentieth century, suspensions were relatively successful: in 24 out of 38 cases the gold standard was resumed without devaluations and the inconvertible paper money remained in circulation during the suspension. 2 See calculations by Santoni (1984) .
3 Bordo and Kydland (1995) .
According to Bordo et al monetary policy under the suspensions was credible, because the gold standard was a contingent rule: during a wartime emergency, when the government needed to collect seigniorage revenue, the gold standard rule could be abandoned temporarily on the understanding that after the emergency had passed safely convertibility would be restored at original parity. Along the lines of this theory, agents considered the gold standard and the suspension to be essentially the same monetary system and could not think of any feasible alternatives to gold: 'Thus, when an emergency occurred, the abandonment of the standard would be viewed by all to be a temporary event since, from their [the public 's] experience, only gold or gold-backed claims truly served as money.'
4
My interpretation of contingency di¤ers from that of Bordo et al in that I assume the resumption of the gold standard to be endogenous, not exogenous. I chose this alternative approach because it is supported by historical evidence: …rstly, the resumption date was unknown during the suspensions or policy makers moved previously agreed resumption date forward; and secondly, on several occasions the return to the gold standard created strong political opposition. In this paper the bad state, war, can lead to two potential defaults. The …rst default is what Grossman and Van Huyck (1988) call excusable and it occurs when the authority is forced to abandon the commitment technology, the gold standard, upon arrival of the bad state. The second potential default follows the monetary authority's decision not to resume the original gold convertibility rule even though the state of the world has switched back to the good state. This default is total and unjusti…ed, and leads to the loss of the monetary authority's reputation. But if the resumption of the commitment rule involves incurring a cost, as in this model, the authority might not have an incentive to resume the rule. A key objective of the model is to de…ne conditions which ensure that the second default does not occur and the gold convertibility rule is resumed.
4 Bordo and Kydland (1995) .
In this paper I evaluate the question of what makes monetary policy credible and time consistent in the absence of the commitment mechanism -the gold standard. To avoid getting entangled with the historical details of various suspension periods, I develop a dynamic general equilibrium model of the gold standard and the suspension, and use it to analyze the extent by which the gold standard functions as a contingent rule. The model demonstrates that the gold standard with a …xed gold reserve ratio is a commitment technology that solves the economy's time inconsistency problem in the conduct of monetary policy if the economy has nominal rigidities, but the suspension of the gold standard subsequently reveals the problem. Because the money base under the suspension is not …xed to the existing gold reserve, the central bank, in the presence of sticky wages, has an opportunity to expand output and yield seigniorage to the government by issuing inconvertible paper money. I conduct the analysis within the cash-in-advance model, which, by emphasizing the paper money as a medium of exchange, describes the role of paper money in those relatively developed economies that suspended the convertibility rule.
As suspension periods often lasted several years, even decades, the policy maker and the public had time to interact, and, therefore, my model emphasizes the paramount role of the public's expectations and policy maker's reputation in making the suspension a credible regime. Following Chari and Kehoe (1990) , the model adapts Abreau's (1988) optimal penal codes under discounting to policy games played between a benevolent government and private sector. The sustainable policy plan during the suspension -to resume the gold standard at the old par value in the future -is supported by a reputational equilibrium in which private expectations display an extreme form of trigger-like behavior: a single deviation by the central bank from its announced plan to resume the gold standard causes the economy to revert permanently to its worst possible outcome, which, in this commodity standard setup, I call a commodity money. If compared with the gold standard, the commodity money regime, where only gold coins circulate as a medium of exchange, is ine¢ cient and reduces welfare. The gold standard is resumed if the incentive compatibility constraint is satis…ed:
the discounted net utility of the adjustment and the gold standard has to be larger or equal to the discounted net utility of default and the commodity money thereafter.
My theoretical analysis produces three main results. Firstly, the suspension is a credible regime, because the resumption of the gold standard at the original par value is a sustainable plan. The central bank's plan to resume the gold standard at some future point replaces the gold standard as a reputational device, which limits discretionary money creation and solves the time inconsistency problem. Secondly, the model explains why the central bank resumes the gold standard although the suspension, by increasing a degree of ‡exibility in the economy, proves to be a relatively successful regime. The gold standard is resumed, because it maximizes social welfare in the long-run as during normal times the central bank cannot conduct time consistent monetary policy without commitment technology. Finally, sustainability of the resumption plan is of vital importance to the economy during war.
Private agents accept paper money as a medium of exchange because they believe that in the future paper money would again be convertible. Sustainability of wartime monetary policy enables the central bank to (i) stabilize output and consumption through private discount policy; (ii) derive seigniorage revenue to the government through public discount policy and (iii) postpone the welfare reducing adjustment to peacetime.
Despite the long-standing interest of economists in the suspensions, only a handful of open market models exist, 5 and the suspension has not been modelled in the general equilibrium, or a credibility and time inconsistency framework. Although many aspects of my model are in the tradition of the relatively recently published classical models on a commodity money standard proposed by Barro (1979) , Sargent and Wallace (1983) , Goodfriend (1988) , Velde 5 Miller and Sutherland (1996) .
and Weber (2000) and Bordo et al. (2003) , the fundamental di¤erence is that I model the 
A Dynamic General Equilibrium Model of the Gold Standard and the Suspension
The analysis requires the development of a new theoretical model in which the gold standard rule can be suspended and in which the gold standard operates as a domestic rather than an international monetary policy rule. The gold standard is a commitment technology, which, as in Chari and Kehoe (1990) , is sustainable by de…nition and solves the economy's time inconsistency problem. Four key elements of the model are (i) nominal wages are sticky; (ii) the paper money has value only if private agents are able to convert it to gold instantly or at some future point; (iii) the central bank functions also as a …nancial intermediate and issues unbacked paper money through discounting; and, (iv) the suspension of the gold standard is exogenous in the bad state of the world, but the resumption of the gold standard is not exogenous when the economy is again in the good state of the world. In particular, (i) and (iii) are supported by historical evidence. 
The gold reserve ratio, which de…nes the proportion of the circulating paper money stock that is backed by monetary gold, is denoted by t 2 (0; 1].
During the time of peace the household is endowed with …xed amount A s of new gold which is measured in ounces and the household's gold demand A t is de…ned through its optimization problem. By contrast, during war A s = 0 and A t is assumed to approach A g t 6 Lindert and Williamson (1984) and Hanes (1993) suggest that nominal wages were sticky in England and the US in the 18 th and 19 th centuries. Du¤y (1982) shows that the Bank of England was an active …nancial intermediary from 1797-1821. Alternatively, as in Carlstrom and Fuerst (1995) , private banks could act as an intermediary, to whom the central bank forwards monetary transfers, but the former approach was chosen for simplicity.
that re ‡ects a bank run panic. The latter case is discussed in section 2. 
The equation (2) 
I assume that x t 2 (0; x) and z t 2 [1; z), where x = z = (1 + QA s ). A law restricts smelting of coins back to consumable form, and therefore the lowest bound of the specie growth rate equals one. The upper bound of both z t and x t implies that private gold consumption A t approaches zero and the household converts its whole gold endowment to paper currency or specie. As a result of the household's choices, the ‡ow of motion of specie become
where 2 (0; 1) is the …xed depreciation rate of specie between period t and t + 1 and is brassage, the exogenous cost of minting.
In this model, as in many countries during the historical gold standard period, the central bank functions as a …nancial intermediary by discounting bonds issued by the government and private bills issued by the …rm. The central bank, after having accepted period t gold deposit A g t+1 A g t from the household, loans out cash to the government and the …rm at the …xed rate R 1. As a result (1 t ) is the ratio of the total nominal discount B t to the stock of central bank paper money.
As neither the government nor the …rm have access to the gold endowment, they face a cash constraint in that they have to take a one period loan B t from the central bank in order to be able to buy a public good, or respectively, pay for workers. The government starts the period t by paying the principal and interest of its previous period's loan (1 t ) RB t to the central bank. The public sector's share of the total discount B t is denoted by (1 t ).
Then it takes a new loan (1 t+1 ) B t+1 to pay its current period t expenditure, and at the end of the period t the government imposes a taxT t to the household. The government's period-by-period budget constraint is
As in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2000), the government is subject to a cash-in-advance constraint on its purchases of real goods G t ;
The representative …rm uses labor L t it hires from the household to produce current output via its production technology f (K; L t ). The …rm produces, pays for its workers, sells the output to the household on demand for consumption on a cash basis, and after receiving its revenue, the …rm pays pro…ts to the household and saves the principal and the interest of its current period discount, which are paid to the central bank next period. The cash-inadvance constraint for the …rm's wage bill becomes
where t+1 is the …rm's sector share of the total discount. The …rm hires labor supplied by the household and the production takes place during the goods exchange. The …rm takes its price P t from the market, wage from the contract and chooses B t+1 and L t to maximize its pro…ts. The household supplies whatever labor the …rm demands. Given these speci…cations the …rm's pro…t maximization problem becomes: maximize
subject to (8). The …rm's production function is of form
where K is the …xed stock of capital, L t is labor demand in period t, 0 < < 1; and
is a strictly concave function. In equilibrium the real wage bill of the …rm must be equal to the marginal product of labor
I assume that the …rm and the household agree on wages, which are set in advance for a period, before the period's gold endowment is realized, and before the central bank had made a decision over the period's discount. Although the nominal wage, as in Canzoneri and Dellas (1998) , is chosen before the state of the world is known, it is set at a level that is expected to produce the real wage which equates labor supply and labor demand, and clears the goods market. The wage setting follows a simple exogenous process: if the current state is peace, the wage setters anticipate the following state to be peace and vice versa. To de…ne the wage, the notional labor supply is set at one, although the actual labor supply and demand may di¤er from this. The contract wage for period t is
where t is the expected value of P t before the state of the world is known or the production started. If (10) and the contract wage is substituted back into (11) the labor demand of the representative …rm can be written as
: If K is normalized to 1 and the labor demand is substituted to (10), one obtains
Respectively, the real wage bill of the …rm becomes The central bank can either increase or decrease the economy's paper money supply through its discount policy. The rate of discretionary monetary expansion is denoted by d t and it is an inverse of the growth rate of the gold reserve ratio
The higher d t ; the lower the proportion of the circulating paper money stock that is backed by monetary gold. I assume d t to be bounded above by printing and storage constraint d, which is assumed to be higher than x or z. As stressed by Barro (1979) , the real economy restricts gold supply, and therefore, x and z; but the upper bound of discretionary paper money growth rate d can be taken to be arbitrarily large, i.e. d t 2 0; d for all t = 0; 1; :::; and x; z < d < 1: The net growth rate of the economy's paper money supply M s t+1 on period t + 1 can be de…ned 7 as
Before solving for the household problem, let us scale the nominal variables in gold endowment constraint (3), the government and …rm cash-in-advance constraints (7) and (8) and in 7 This is just an alternative way to de…ne (1):
the …rm's problem with the economy's total money supply (14) so that
In the …rm's problem the scaled expected price level t is denoted by ! t :
The household's preferences are given by the value of discounted utility per period,
where the discount factor 0 < < 1 and the utility function satis…es:
In (15) C t denotes the consumption of a perishable good and A t consumption of gold. To simplify the analysis, and to ensure demand for gold in each period, I assume the household to yield utility only of 'new gold'; alternatively, if I assumed gold to depreciate in use, in the steady state equilibrium the gold demand would equal the depreciated amount. Note that as gold coins cannot be smelted to consumable form, the household is not able to prepare for wartime gold demand by hoarding specie during peace.
The household enters period t with predetermined nominal money m t and depreciated specie worth q S t . The household then agrees on the nominal wage with the …rm after which the state of the world is realized. If it is peace, the household receives its gold endowment worth qA s . The household is in the position to do its gold trade and minting. The household chooses how much gold to consume, how much to mint and how much to convert to paper money. After these decisions the household's currency holdings are
Finally, the household receives its labor income w t L t . The rest of the currency holdings are transferred to the goods market. The cash-in-advance constraint that restricts household's consumption purchases becomes
consumption during the same period and enters into the cash-in-advance constraint. At the end of period t the household receives the cash dividend payment f t from the …rm, the interest yield c t from the central bank and carries the rest of the unspent currency into period t + 1. Hence the household's budget constraint states
As in Carlstrom and Fuerst (1995) there are four markets present in this economy: the goods market, labor market, credit market and money market which in the gold standard setup is synonymous with the gold market. The private agents' problem must satisfy the resource constraint and market clearing conditions
for all t = 0; 1; 2:::. By writing (13) for t+1 , and substituting it and (14) to (23) gives
If this is substituted into (19) and (20) we get:
Like in Chari and Kehoe (1990) , the private agents' behavior can be summarized by allocations ( ; ) and allocation rules ( ; ). For each period t let t = 1;t ; 2;t be the household's allocations for the …rst and second stages of period t; where 1;t = (A t ; S s t ) and 2;t = (C t ; S t+1 ; m (15) subject to (16), (17) and normalized (3), which becomes
(26). From the …rst-order conditions the marginal ratio of substitution between consumption and gold equals their price ratio
Using the …rst order conditions for intemporal consumption and gold consumption must satisfy
By de…ning M 0 = S 0 = 1 and using market clearing conditions (21)- (23) and (25), the cash-in-advance constraint (16) can be expressed as
By substituting (12) and (24) into (18), rewriting this for C t and substituting to (29), the condition for the price level becomes
From these initial solutions, especially from equations (12), (30), and (31), it can be seen that in this economy the central bank is able to create surprise in ‡ation to stimulate economic activity. If the discretionary money growth rate d t is higher than the …rm and the household expected, the price level p t will be above the expected price level ! t , which will increase output, employment and consumption.
Within the above de…nitions and initial solutions of the government, …rm and household's problems in hand, I turn to consider the economy under two possible states of the world:
the time of peace, when the commitment technology -the gold standard with …xed -is available, and the time of war, when the gold standard becomes dysfunctional. In this model the gold convertibility rule with …xed is an exogenous monetary policy rule, not an outcome of an optimization problem, and therefore, policy under the gold standard does not directly compare with an optimal policy under commitment, called the Ramsey policy, in Chari and Kehoe (1990) , Stokey (1989) , Ireland (1997) and Chang (1998) .
The Gold Standard with the Constant Reserve Ratio: Commitment Technology
Consider, …rst, the economy during peace, when at the beginning of time the government commits to the gold convertibility rule, and, as in Barro (1979) and Goodfriend (1988) , commits to keep the gold reserve ratio constant at t = for all t = 0; 1; 2; :::. This section shows that the gold standard with the constant reserve ratio is a commitment technology that solves the economy's time inconsistency problem that is created by the nominal wage stickiness.
De…nition 1. The gold standard equilibrium with the constant reserve ratio is a policy d = fd t = 1 j t = 0; 1; :::g and the agents'allocation rules ( ; ) that satisfy the …rm's problem to choose L t and b t+1 to maximize pro…ts (9), and the household's problem to choose A t ; C t ; m s t ; S t ; S s t and m t+1 to maximize its utility (15) subject to constraints (16), (17) and (26) for all t = 0; 1; :::, taking A s ; p t ; R; f t ; c t and w t given for all t = 0; 1; :::.
If t = for all t = 0; 1; 2; ::: (13) indicates that d t = 1. The gold standard equilibrium is derived in Appendix A, which also establishes Proposition 1. Under the gold standard rule with constant ; z t = 1; and in equilibrium S s t = 0 for all t = 0; 1; :::, and S t ! 0 when t ! 1.
Under the constant rule in equilibrium the utility maximizing household does not mint any new specie and only the gradually depreciating initial stock of specie remains in circulation. What is the intuition for this result? The cash-in-advance constraint imposes a cost on the economy in that some gold must be used for transaction purposes, either by converting it to paper money or minting it to coins. The household is better o¤ in terms of welfare by using paper currency as a medium of exchange, because specie depreciates and is involved with a minting cost that reduce the amount of gold in utility yielding form. In the real world there are physical restrictions on how small coins can be minted and used, but similar restrictions do not apply to paper currency, which can be printed in any denominations. The paper currency has two bene…ts over specie: …rstly, through the government's expenditure constraint (7) and the …rm's wage constraint (8) it facilitates …nancial intermediation; and secondly, by reducing the cost of acquiring money, it increases the household's welfare. Therefore, the model assumes that the specie stock gets arbitrarily small and insigni…cant in economic sense when time goes by, and the analysis is carried out under the assumption that S t = S s t = 0:
Proposition 1 together with the gold standard rule with constant implies that the total paper money supply (14) 
and
Appendix B establishes
Proposition 2. The gold standard rule with constant solves the economy's time inconsistency problem, and eliminates any uncertainty about the money growth rate.
The policy d = 1 under the gold standard together with particular allocation t = (1) and t = (1) is called the gold standard outcome and is denoted by (1; g ; g ). It describes the sequences of equilibrium prices and quantities that are obtained when the central bank manages gold reserves and converts gold to paper currency on demand according to the exogenous gold standard rule, and the private agents respond to the exogenous ‡ow of gold by maximizing utility and pro…ts. The gold standard outcome can be described by the following two proposition:
Proposition 3. The gold standard outcome implies that in equilibrium
Proof: In equilibrium ! t = p t and by substituting it and (18) into (12) we get that (32) and reorganizing, the gold consumption becomes
for all t = 0; 1; :::.
Under the gold standard with constant the …rst-order-condition for m t+1 is x t t = t+1 + t+1 ; where and are the lagrange multipliers of the household's budget and cash-in-advance constraints. Let us now assume that x t is bound below by so that in the steady state , the shadow value of money, is non-negative and the gold standard equilibrium, in which paper money is always used as a medium of exchange, exists.
Proposition 4.
Suppose that x g t 2 ( ; qA s + 1) : Welfare under the gold standard equilibrium is maximized when x g t equals for all t = 0; 1; :::.
Proof: In equilibrium C t = 1 G t . The gold demand A t decreases when x g t falls and welfare increases when x g t approaches its lower bound : The discounted utility
where
; is strictly decreasing on (x g ; x g ) = ( ; qA s + 1) for all t = 0; 1; :::.
When x g = for all t = 0; 1; ::: the discounted utility equals
Under the gold standard with constant the household consumes its whole gold endowment and converts some of its existing paper currency to gold in equilibrium. When the central bank commits to the gold convertibility rule and to keep constant, the bank loses the ability to boost production and employment by increasing the discretionary money growth rate through discounting, hence the gold standard rule solves the time inconsistency problem which arises from the sticky wage structure.
The Suspension of the Gold Standard Rule: Accommodation
The exogenous switch between the states occurs after the …rm and the household have set wages, and is observed by all agents. The gold endowment is zero in the bad state, A t approaches A g t ; and as a result of a bank run, the lowest bound of x t is no longer well de…ned by . If the central bank did not suspend the gold standard, by (33) the price level would fall and the expected price level ! t would be above the actual price level, and, as stated in section 2.1, this would have adverse e¤ects on employment and production. From the …rm and government cash-in-advance constraints, any gold conversion would reduce the reserves on which the …rm or the government can borrow. Finally, from (34), a fall in money holdings would reduce private consumption.
To restore monetary stability at the beginning of war, the central bank deviates from the gold standard rule and follows the suspension rule. This deviation is excusable and the new rule implies that during war the central bank does not convert paper notes to gold immediately, but promises to resume the gold convertibility at the old par value q at some future point after the crises has passed and the gold reserve is again at its pre-war level.
During the suspension period the value of the household's paper currency is not de…ned by (1), but by the credibility of the central bank's promise to convert the currency in the future.
The bad state, whether war or some natural disaster, can last for several periods, but is not known to last forever.
De…nition 2 The policy of the central bank during the suspension is a plan according to which the central bank (i) issues only unbacked paper money during war, (ii) immediately after the war starts adjusting economy to the gold standard by withdrawing paper money from circulation whilst still preventing money-to-gold conversion, and (iii) resumes the gold standard at old par value q when is at its pre-war level. During war the suspension enables the central bank to stabilize production and consumption by its private discount policy, and given that G increases during the war, yield the government some seigniorage by its public discount policy. After the arrival of peace the central bank adjusts the economy by constraining its discounts. The bene…t of this policy is the timing of potential reduction in welfare after the war, not during the war. In what follows I assume that periods between and + j 1 are the wartime monetary expansion periods. Peace arrives in period + j and periods between + j and + S; S < 1 ; are the adjustment periods. Period + S is the …nal suspension period. The household chooses its second stage allocation 2; +i (h +i ) = C +i ; b +i ; m s +i ; m +i and the contingency plan for all future histories, and the …rm chooses its allocation t+i (h +i ) = (L +i ; B +i+1 ) conditional on realization of history h +i : These de…nitions recognize that the household makes its decision in two stages and …rm in one.
As in Ireland (1997) without commitment technology p +i and w +i are also functions of the history of the central bank's policy: Starting from any date after the announcement to suspend the cash payments, the private agents can forecast these variables using the recursive formula h +i = [h +i 1 ; +i (h +i 1 )] where i = 0; 1; :::; S; and their knowledge of price level, wage and interest rate determination processes.
Consider …rst the private agents'problem during the suspension of the gold standard rule.
The representative …rm's problem is to choose L +i (h +i ) and b +i+1 (h +i ) to maximize
subject to
given for all i = 0; 1; :::; S.
The household chooses C +i ; A +i ; m s +i , and m +i to maximize
subject to the the cash-in-advance constraint
the budget constraint
and the endowment constraint
By de…nition, 1; +i (h +i 1 ) = A +i = ; during the wartime expansion periods i = 0; :::; j 1; and 1; +i (h +i 1 ) > 0 during the adjustment periods i = j; :::; S. From these de…nitions it follows that x t = 1 when i = 0; :::; j 1 (expansion); x 1 when i = j; :::; S (adjustment) and x de…ned as under the gold standard if the gold standard is resumed when i = S + 1.
At each period + i when i = 0; 1; :::; S; the central bank takes h +j 1 as given and chooses a continuation policy +i to solve the following problem: choose d +i to maximize (36), where C +i and A +i are determined by and ; subject to the terminal condition
Appendix A establishes that the terminal condition (40) can be written as
The terminal condition states that monetary gold must be proportional to the circulating money stock and by the time of the resumption. Incorporated in plan i ; the terminal condition implies that once the gold ‡ow resumes, the central bank must set d +i < 1, i = j; :::; S in order to withdraw the …at money from circulation. The net discretionary money growth satis…es
The price level and consumption during the wartime expansion periods become:
and during the adjustment periods respectively:
As the discretionary money 'withdrawal'rate during the adjustment satis…es 0 d +i 1; the price level is lower during the adjustment than expansion. Whether the consumption is lower during adjustment than war depends also on G +i .
De…nition 3. A sustainable equilibrium ( ; ; ) consists of a policy plan and a set of allocation rules ( ; ) that satisfy: (i) given a policy plan and the household's allocation rule , the continuation of solves the …rm's problem to maximize (35) subject to L +i and history h +i ; (ii) given and the …rm's allocation rule ; the continuation of solves the household's problem to maximize (36) subject to (37), (38), (39) and history h +i 1 and h t+i ;
(iii) given the allocation rules ( ; ) ; the continuation of plan solves the central bank's problem to choose d +i to maximize (36) for every history h +i 1 and the terminal condition (41).
The sustainable outcome (d; ; ) describes the sequence of equilibrium quantities and prices that are obtained when the central bank chooses d +i sequentially to maximize (36) subject to (41), and private agents respond optimally. As in Chari and Kehoe (1990) the set of sustainable outcomes is formed recursively: starting from h 1 = 1; construct h = (h ; h +1 ; :::) and d = (d ; d +1 ; :::) recursively using d +i = +i (h +i 1 ) and h +i = [h +i 1 ; +i (h +i 1 )] : Then for all i = 0; 1; :::; S construct = (L ; L +1 ; :::) using L +i = (h +i ) and = ; +1 ; ::: using 1; +i = (h +i 1 ) and 2; +i = (h +i ) for all i = 0; 1; :::. These recursive de…nitions are used in the next section to illustrate how the central bank's plan , if it is sustainable, leads to the resumption of the gold standard.
3 Sustainability of the Resumption Plan
Sustainable Outcomes
In this section I use the model of sustainable plans to address the question raised in the Introduction: What made monetary policy credible during suspension periods in the absence of the commitment technology? In the following I assume that taxes cannot be increased and any additional wartime expenditure has to be …nanced through seigniorage.
Consider the household's decision making problem both during the expansion and the adjustment periods. During war when A s = 0 the household has no choice over the medium of exchange and has to accept inconvertible paper currency. The cash-in-advance constraint formalizes this assumption and embodies some relevant historical evidence. According to Feavearyear (1963) during the Suspension Period of 1797-1821 the public 'accepted the notes because there was nothing else and because they served the purposes of trade for the time being as well as gold' 8 . The war, however, lasts for a …nite time and the return of the gold endowment gives the household an opportunity to start minting coins and stop using paper money if it considers the central bank's plan to resume the gold standard not to be credible.
The central bank has an incentive to avoid the adjustment process, because withdrawing …at money from circulation has adverse real e¤ects on the economy with sticky nominal wages. It is the threat imposed by the household's revenge strategy that may support the resumption of the gold standard. As in Chari and Kehoe (1990) and Ireland (1997) , the set of sustainable outcomes, which in this model refers to the outcomes that result of the resumption of the gold standard, can be characterized by adapting Abreu (1988) optimal penal codes to monetary policy games played between a benevolent central bank and a large number of private agents.
The autarky plan a is de…ned as follows. Private agents agree on w +i , then all sectors observe that A s > 0. The household then chooses a …rst-stage allocation of 1; +i (h +i 1 ) > 0 where i j and a contingency plan for setting future actions for all possible future histories.
The central bank, given the history h +i 1 ; sets the time + i discretionary money growth rate in following manner: for any h +i 1 let a (h +i 1 ) be the optimal money growth rate in the problem: maximize
subject to d +i d; where A +i is given by 1; +i (h +i 1 ) and i j. Next, at the second stage of period + i, both the household and the …rm face the history h +i = [h +i 1 ; a (h +i 1 )].
The household chooses its second stage allocation 2; +i (h +i ) and the contingency plan for all future histories and the …rm chooses its allocation t+i (h +i ).
Proposition 5. The policy under the autarky plan is
Proof: Period + i consumption (45) 
where x +i (h +i 1 ) 1. C a +i is the maximum current-period consumption at period +i the central bank can achieve by supplying the maximum amount of paper money.
As the result of the deviation from the declared policy plan the economy reverts to the commodity money system which is a static equilibrium, because the allocation rules and policy plans do not depend on the past history. The household has abandoned the paper currency altogether, only specie circulates and …nancial intermediation does not exist. s +i (h +i 1 ) = ;: For every history h +i 1 the rule speci…es that the household does not take any gold to the central bank, but mints some of its gold endowment to specie.
With the given history h t+i the household chooses A +i ; S +i ; S s +i ; and C +i to maximize
subject to the specie-in-advance constraint
and the gold endowment constraint
for all i > j: The nominal variables have been scaled with S s +i+1 = z +i S s +i .
As the paper currency has lost its value, specie is the only medium of exchange. Without paper money the central bank is not able to o¤er …nancial intermediation.
Proposition 7. The static outcome (;;
and A +i = A s q 1 (z 1) where z 1:
Proof : The proof is identical to the proof of Proposition 3, but m s and m are replaced with S s and S.
Proposition 8. Welfare under the static equilibrium,
is lower than under the gold standard.
Proof : The optimal money growth rate under the gold standard, x g = < 1; but the optimal specie supply rate z 1 because the smelting of specie is illegal. In the steady state the laws of motion (4) implies that z = 1 + (1 ) = (1 + ). The faster the depreciation of specie or the higher the brassage, the higher is z. Under the static equilibrium gold specie is used as a medium of exchange, which together with and reduce A t , gold in the utility yielding form.
The next proposition characterizes the entire set of sustainable outcomes which ensure the resumption of the gold standard. For an arbitrary sequence of policies and allocations (d; ; ) ; the revert-to-static policy plans specify continuation with the plan to resume the gold standard as long as the policy de…ned by the original plan has been chosen in the past.
The allocation rule speci…es that immediately after a deviation the household and the …rm will follow the rule de…ned by the static allocation rule and stay in this static state in all subsequent periods.
Proposition 9. Sustainability of the resumption of the gold standard with constant :
let d be an arbitrary policy and ( ; ) an arbitrary allocation. Then the return to the gold standard is sustainable if and only if (d; ; ) satis…es
where A +i ; C +i ; S +i+1; S s +i m +i+1 and m s +i are given by ; and L +i and b +i are given by :
Proposition 9 implies that the resumption of the gold standard is sustainable, if the adjustment to the gold standard between periods +j and +S and gold standard thereafter will yield at least as much utility as default on period + j and static state thereafter.
Incentive compatibility constraint (52) completely characterizes the conditions under which an arbitrary sequence of policies and allocations is sustainable. The adjustment between periods + j and + S and the gold standard thereafter must provide at least as much utility from + j forward than what is obtained by deviating from the resumption plan in period + j and reverting to the autarky thereafter. Inequality (52) is the key result of this paper. It suggests that countries returned to the gold standard after war time suspensions because the bene…ts of the gold standard did outweigh the cost of adjustment, which was a necessary procedure for resumption.
The Suspensions and Sustainable Plans: Some Examples
In this section I present some simple but suggestive examples of optimal monetary policy during the suspensions, and demonstrate how theory of sustainable plans can interpret historical development of three suspension periods.
Resumption or Default? Welfare comparison
The ultimate objective of this example is to illustrate the logic behind Proposition 9, and
to de…ne under what conditions resumption of the gold standard is a sustainable plan. To avoid having to work with approximations I develop a simple example in which war lasts for a period and the central bank's plan ; which de…nes monetary policy during the suspension, implies that the bank withdraws all wartime …duciary paper money from circulation during the period that follows immediately after the war period.
During the suspension the central bank's problem is to choose the optimal discretionary money growth rate d war to maximize the household's discounted net utility (36) subject to requirements that prices and quantities are determined by allocation rules ( ; ) that solve the …rm and household problems and are consistent with the terminal condition (40) under the gold standard steady state the ratio between the utility yielded from gold to the utility from consumption is relatively small, i.e. 0.15. Price expectations are formed so that ! +i = p +i 1 ; thus ! war = p gold , and the price level during war exceeds the expected price level.
If the adjustment period follows the war period, the terminal condition (40) implies that all …duciary paper money issued during war must be withdrawn from circulation on the following adjustment period. As a result the withdrawal rate d adj becomes an inverse of d war ,
i.e. d adj = 1=d war ; so that (40) holds. Furthermore, the gold backing ratio during adjustment can now be de…ned in terms of d war . From (13) we have that adj = =d war , in which is the constant gold reserve ratio during the gold standard. Given above speci…cations, the household's consumption during the war and adjustment periods become:
Equations (53) and (54) imply that d war increases C war and wartime welfare, but respectively, reduces C adj and welfare during the adjustment period. (52), the discounted net utility under the adjustment and the gold standard. As can be seen from …gure 2, the discounted utility falls when d war increases.
The solid line in …gure 2 plots the left hand side of inequality (52), the discounted net utility from the default and deviation to the static state. By contrast, the relative bene…t of a default increases when d war increases because the higher d war , the higher the welfare loss of adjustment is going to be. By defaulting the plan to resume the gold standard the central bank avoids the costly adjustment process. I assume, loosely based on the default of assignats in France in 1796 (see …gure 3.2.2), that a default of is equivalent to a fourfold increase in the money growth rate in one period. were poor until the mechanical minting started in the 1830s. 9 In addition, illegal activities such as clipping and shaving reduced the weight of coins, so that instead of by face value, during the historical gold standard period coins were accepted only by weight.
10
Given the above speci…cations the highest sustainable discretionary money growth rate 9 By the beginning of the twentieth century the depreciation had fallen to 0.002-0.005 percent per year. Cassel (1930) and Kitchen (1930) as quoted by Kitchen (1930) . 10 Craig (1953). during war is 2.30, when (52) holds with equality. As …gure 2 suggests, if d war 2 (1; 2:30) the resumption of the gold standard is sustainable, and the circelled line that plots the discounted net utility of adjustment and gold standard thereafter lies above the solid line that plots the net utility of default and deviation. However, if the central bank sets the money growth rate d war above 2.30, default and the commodity money standard thereafter would yield higher utility than resumption of the gold standard.
Finally, assume that the central bank sets d war = 2:30. Figure 3 .2.1 illustrates the level of consumption and prices when the gold standard is suspended at the beginning of period 1, the economy is adjusted in period 2 and the gold standard is resumed at the beginning of period 3. As can be seen, both the price level and consumption rise during war. In the adjustment period consumption falls, because the price level is now below its expected level.
After the resumption both the price level and consumption approach gradually their level under the gold standard. The bene…t of suspension is that the welfare reducing adjustment occurs after war, not during it. See, for example, Bordo and Redish (1993) , Bordo and Kydland (1995) and Sargent and Velde (1995) . 12 The Bank of England's suspension announcement published in The Times 28 February 1797.
13 Barrett (1931) pp. 12-13. handful of French troops in Wales in January 1797 14 or the Trent A¤air in November 1861, 15 which triggered bank runs and the suspension of specie payments.
The model suggests that the suspension was an excusable default to which markets did not react adversely. In France …nancial markets seemed to believe in assignats: the yield of French consols fell from 7.5% in late 1789 to 5.3% in early 1790. 16 In England and the US interest rates increased ahead of suspension, but fell after the suspension had placated markets. The rate of English consols increased approximately from 4.3% in January 1796 to 6.2% in January 1798 but fell in early 1799 and remained around 5% throughout the suspension. 17 In the US the long term interest rate increased from 6.7% in 1860 to 7.8% in 1861 and fell below 6 % in 1862.
18
The initial remedy of the suspension, however e¢ cient, was not su¢ cient to maintain the circulation and the value of paper money continuously during war. The plan to restore specie payments on an uncertain future date had to be transparent to be credible. In France the government and the National Assembly intended to retire assignats by allowing holders to purchase con…scated church lands in auctions, and to destroy returned assignats. The Bank of England was careful not to call its notes legal tender currency, because they could have become associated in the public mind with the failed assignats and indicate that the monetary standard had changed permanently. 19 Parliament extended the term of the Restriction Acts eleven times between 1797 and 1821. These additional acts declared that the gold standard will be resumed but that resumption was not possible until 'One Month after the conclusion 14 Fetter (1965) .
15 Barrett (1931) p. 72.
16 Bordo and White (1991) .
17 Gayer et al. (1953) .
O¢ cer (2008).
19 Fetter (1965) During war the public used paper money as a medium of exchange, because warfare and government demand of specie disturbed coinage and gold trade. Coins with intrinsic value remained in hoards until inconvertible paper currency had ceased to be the 'bad money'-along the lines of Gresham's law -and both in England and in the US specie and paper currency circulated side-by-side before the resumption. 23 The model emphasizes that in the absence of substitutes the monetary authority can force paper money into circulation during war, but it cannot issue uncontrollably, as a sequence of French revolutionary governments discovered after they had breached the resumption plan. French authorities failed to organize land auctions e¢ ciently and assignats, especially those with low face value, remained in circulation. 21 Bordo and Kydland (1996) p. 72. 22 See Calomiris (1994) and Bordo and Kydland (1996) .
23 Clapham (1944) Vol. II p. 3 and Calomiris (1993) pp. 88-89.
24 Sargent and Velde (1995 index of domestic goods, and …gure 3.2.2, which plots the total US money stock and the consumer price index in the US, reveal contrasts between these successful …duciary standards with assignats but also with each other. Unlike in France where the money stock increased uncontrollably, in England and in the US the money stock increased during war but fell, although with di¤erent rate, after the arrival of peace in 1815 and 1865 respectively. On the other hand, the prolonged Napoleonic Wars led to a sharp adjustment, but the relatively short Civil War was followed by a gradual reduction. Political development -disputes between Bullionists and Anti-bullionists and supporters of hard and soft money -explain di¤erences, as in both countries the resumption sparked a furious con ‡ict of opinions over the conduct of monetary policy. In England opponents of resumption did never form the majority in Parliament, and David Ricardo and other bullionists' quantity theory became the dominant opinion that endorsed swift resumption. In the US alternating political victories of soft and hard money supporters had an e¤ect on money stock, visible in as The Times, reported of bankruptcies, crowded workhouses and starving labourers regularly between 1817 and 1820. In the US the government retired emergency Civil War legal tender money immediately after the war. Even though de ‡ation of 50% took over between 1865 -1878 , Friedmand and Schwartz (1963 argue that adverse e¤ects of resumption to output have been exaggerated. Declining prices were accompanied by a rapid rate of growth in real income and fast growth of population. Slow adjustment allowed the economy to grow to its money stock.
26
The total stock of currency and the consumer price index, annually, 1860-1879. Source:
O¢ cer (2008) and Carter et al. (2006) .
The strongest argument this paper makes is embodied in the incentive compatibility constraint (52), which states that after the default the country is never able to return to the gold standard. After the assignat hyperin ‡ation the Directory created a new currency, mandat, which again was backed by land sales but now in …xed prices rather than auctions, but the experiment failed even though the government did not issue a note beyond its maximum ceiling. 27 The new dictator, Napoleon Bonaparte, conducted a series of institutional changes that included establishment of Banque de France, and re-established the bimetallic standard in 1803. Napoleon gave an impression that he detested the lending and paper money practices of the previous governments and favored gold and taxation over paper money and borrowing.
According to Bordo and White (1991) his pronouncements were aimed at restoring con…-dence, but since the reputation of the country was destroyed, this was probably the best he could do, and he failed to secure enough funds for the disastrous Russian Campaign. England and the US, by contrast, resumed the gold standard successfully. These two countries 26 Friedmand and Schwartz (1963) pp. 41-43 and p.81.
27 Sargent and Velde (1995) .
became rivals in the …nancial leadership of the world and the gold standard helped them to secure real, non-in ‡ationary growth until the First World War.
Conclusions
In this paper I reassess the suspension of the gold standard rule in the light of developments in monetary theory since Kydland and Prescott (1977) . The paper models a contingent gold standard that allows for intervals during which only paper money circulates with a variable nominal price. I develop a dynamic general equilibrium model of the gold standard and the suspension, which suggests that the suspension is a credible monetary regime, because the resumption of the gold standard at the old par value in the future is a sustainable plan that replaces the gold standard as a commitment technology during war.
By building on an example …rst developed by Kydland and Prescott (1977) , Chari and Kehoe (1990) demonstrate that the sustainable equilibrium associated with the policy plan is a sequence of history-contingent policies and allocations that are supported both by reputation and extreme trigger strategies. In my model the central bank's plan de…nes that after the war the monetary authority has to start adjusting the economy to the gold standard.
Because the adjustment might reduce welfare temporarily, the authority has a temptation to deviate, i.e. maximize the current period's utility by printing an arbitrarily large amount of money. The outcome is deviation to a permanent static state in which paper money has lost its value and only gold specie circulates as a medium of exchange. The commodity money standard is ine¢ cient: it does not facilitate …nancial intermediation, and depreciation and minting costs reduce gold available in utility yielding form. The gold standard is resumed, because it maximizes welfare in the long-run. The gold standard solves the economy's time inconsistency problem as the benevolent central bank is not able to conduct time consistent monetary policy without commitment technology in the good state of the world.
This article contributes to the understanding of a major development in monetary history, the suspension of the gold standard rule, when only inconvertible …at paper money circulated.
By some tailoring this model could be used in future research to explore individual suspension periods in detail. If the gold endowment was replaced with the competitive gold market, the model would permit analysis of the market price of gold, of which premium increased during the suspensions, but fell the end of suspension. In this model the central bank chooses the money growth rate to maximize the social welfare given the terminal condition, but Bordo and Redish (1993) and Bordo and Kydland (1996) follow the revenue-smoothing hypothesis of Mankiw (1987) , and suggest that central banks suspended the gold standard to smooth public revenue from both taxes and seigniorage. Finally, the Ramsey policy in this model could be expanded to include taxation and borrowing in addition to the money growth rate to give accurate description of economic policy during the historical suspension periods. Bordo and Redish (1993) argue that the gold standard survived in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries because it permitted temporary suspension of convertibility. The sustainability of the resumption plan gave the central bank an opportunity to conduct accommodative policies during war. Yet, to achieve this favorable position, the central bank had to resist its temptation both to issue too liberally and to avoid the costly adjustment. The gold standard could only function as a contingent rule, if the resumption of the gold standard was a sustainable plan.
In the equilibrium the expected price level ! t must equal the actual price level p t ;which becomes p t = f1 + q + q (1 ) (z t 1) + x t g for all t = 0; 1; 2; :::
As a result consumption simpli…es to C t = 1 G t ; thus in the equilibrium consumption is independent of x t or z t . However, in the equilibrium the gold consumption is a function of x t and z t , because taking gold to the central bank or coinage reduce gold available in consumable form. The private gold consumption is
where x t 2 ( ; 1 + qA s ) and z t 2 (1; 1 + qA s ). Therefore, as long as x t 2 ( ; 1) using only paper currency as a medium of exchange yields higher utility than using both paper currency and coins, or only coins, in exchange. In the gold standard equilibrium with a constant the household utility is maximized when z t = 1 and x t = .
Appendix B
Proof of Proposition 2. Under the gold standard the central bank cannot create surprise in ‡ation by increasing monetary supply as d t = 1; neither there is uncertainty about the future money growth rate x t ; because A s is …xed and the household chooses x t so that ! t = p t for all t = 0; 1; 2; :::. To demonstrate why the household does not have an incentive to choose x t which would yield the actual money growth rate to be above the expected money growth rate, consider the following: assume now that household takes more gold to the central bank to be converted to notes than was assumed during the wage bargain and the price level increases so that ! t < p t : Substituting the wage constraint and (12) into (16) gives a relation between the price level and the money growth rate, thus
Respectively, substituting (B1) into (12) and using (18) gives a relation between money growth level and consumption
Equations (B1) and (B2) imply that both the price level and consumption increase if the rate of monetary expansion proportionate to monetary gold, x t ; increases above the rate used in contract wage setting at the previous period. However, this does not hold in equilibrium.
Intuitively, if at period t 1 wage setters' expectation on the money growth rate at next period is x e ; but the actual money growth rate is x t = x e + t ; where t 2 (0; 1) ; from (B1) the price level increases, which decreases real wages, through (12) increases labor demand and through (B2) increases consumption. Now the wage setters would respond by adjusting their wage expectations to x e + t , then the household would have an incentive to set x t+1 to x t+1 = x e + t+1 where t < t+1 < 1: The process would continue until x t would approach its upper bound (1 + qA s ) and the price expectations ! t would approach the upper bound of the price level p = ! [1 + (1 + qA s )] 1 . As in Barro and Gordon (1983a) any systematic bene…ts of in ‡ation disappear in equilibrium. However, in this commodity standard set up there is an additional constraint (32) which limits the household's willingness to convert gold to paper money. If the money growth rate approaches its upper bound, the household converts almost its whole gold endowment to paper currency. Simultaneously, A t -gold in utility yielding form -approaches zero, which reduces current period utility, while the impact of gold conversion on C t is low since expectations have been adjusted.
Appendix C
The terminal condition states that when the gold standard is resumed, money must be proportional to gold stock
By substituting the left-hand-side by x +S d +S M +S = M +S+1 and writing the right-handside by using
we get
Continuing this recursively backwards until the beginning of the suspension period and recognizing that the gold ‡ow resumes at period + j we get that x d :::
By writing QA g = M and reorganizing we get
